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BOOK REVIEW – YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF 
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM  
By James Brink* 
Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social 
Production Transforms Markets and Freedom  (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2006). ISBN: 0300110561. €34,89. USD 
40.00.1 
I. THE CULTURE WAR 
The West is engaged in an escalating culture war. The 
battlegrounds are the courts, the legislatures, international 
bodies, local communities, and distant countries that 
individually may not have much power to affect the outcome 
though they do have a vital interest in who wins. The war is 
global – and is one that has little to do with gay marriage, 
abortion, terrorism, Darwinism, or religion. It is, in one sense, a 
war going on above our heads, as it is largely concerned with law 
and policy, and society and property. In another sense, it is very 
much a war in the trenches, as it affects our ability to choose 
                                            
* LL.B. Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School at York University. Paper Editor, 
CLPE Research Paper Series, www.comparativeresearch.net. Email: 
jamesbrink@osgoode.yorku.ca. This review is published in (2006) 7 German Law 
Journal 853, online: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=765. 
1 [Wealth of Networks]. An online copy of Yochai Benkler’s book is available 
under a Creative Commons Noncommercial Sharealike licence; it can be 
accessed through the author’s website at http://www.benkler.org. It will also 
be interesting to see what becomes of the wiki “learning and research 
environment” centred around the book which, though largely a blank slate at 
time of writing, is located at  
http://www.benkler.org/wealth_of_networks/index.php/Main_Page.   
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how we will live and interact with each other as consumers, 
creators, and citizens. Consider the following story: 
Diebold is a leading provider of electronic voting machines in 
the United States and Brazil. In the 2002 U.S. elections, voting 
machines were widely seen as an answer to the problem of 
“hanging chads” or imperfectly punctured paper ballots. Public 
assurances of the accuracy and security of the machines were 
taken at face value by mainstream media – not surprising, 
considering the difficulty of analyzing a machine whose 
operation is treated as a state secret. Less trusting internet 
activists, however, made the investigation of the manufacturer’s 
and election officials’ claims a volunteer project. Bev Harris, 
who ran her own website, blackboxvoting.com, was able to 
obtain and publish the specifications and code for the machines 
in 2003, and invited a public review by the computing 
community. She later also received a cache of email from a 
Diebold whistleblower that showed the code on some of the 
machines had been changed after being certified for use in 
elections. Diebold threatened litigation under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). If the company had been 
successful in its attempt to have the emails declared copyrighted 
or privileged, it might have escaped unscathed. However, 
students at various universities had copies of the files and 
distributed them using peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies 
that are nearly impossible to suppress. Most likely because of 
the online discussion, California’s secretary of state set up an 
independent investigation and, within a few months, many of 
California’s voting machines were decertified. 
Yochai Benkler, who reports this and other stories in his erudite 
and expansive book The Wealth of Networks: How Social 
Production Transforms Markets and Freedoms, says we are in 
“a battle, in the domain of law and policy, over the shape of the 
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social settlement that will emerge around the digital 
computation and communications revolution.”2 What do voting 
machines have to do with computers and communication? They 
are part of a new economy – a networked economy – centred 
around information and structured by rules of ownership for 
intellectual outputs. The question is whether this economy will 
be mostly proprietary and tightly controlled by corporate 
interests or if it will give meaningful space to non-market social 
production? The answer to that question has significant 
implications for individual freedom, the public sphere, and the 
shape of our future economy. 
II. THE NETWORKED INFORMATION ECONOMY 
The parties in Benkler’s book are divided into two camps, the 
industrial information economy—a one-way, capital-intensive, 
and professionally-produced model that has held sway for 150 
years—and the networked information economy (NIE)—a many-
to-many, low-capital, and cooperative model that has been 
emerging in the last 15 years. Newspapers, record companies, 
and broadcasters are members of the former; bloggers, file 
sharers, and decentralized programmers and encyclopedia 
writers are members of the latter. The infrastructure that the 
NIE shares is, of course, the internet, which Benkler describes as 
“a communications environment built on cheap processors with 
high computational capabilities, interconnected in a pervasive 
network.”3 This environment is characterized by (1) non-
proprietary strategies, (2) rising non-market production, and (3) 
more effective, large-scale cooperative efforts; in other words, 
“peer production of information, knowledge, and culture.”4 
                                            
2 Wealth of Networks, ibid. at 386. 
3 Ibid. at 3. 
4 Ibid. at 5. 
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Benkler identifies the third feature as the most revolutionary 
because it challenges both our economics and our politics. 
A. THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE 
Benkler sees peer production as an inversion of the conditions 
Ronald Coase explored in his investigation of the relationship 
between the market and the firm.5 Coase pointed out that firms, 
while they compete against other firms according to the rules of 
the market, are not themselves organized according to market 
principles. Markets are organized largely by the price system. 
Producers flock to high prices, consumers to low prices. Inside 
the firm, however, production and consumption are organized 
by managerial fiat. Workers have significantly less freedom 
within the firm to contract for their services than the firm has 
within the market to contract for its products or expertise. 
Coase argues that firms exist because certain transactions are 
easier and cheaper to organize within a command hierarchy than 
within a market. A firm will grow so long as its management 
can rearrange “the factors of production under its control”6 to 
outweigh the benefit of trading those factors on the open 
market.  
Benkler, in an argument developed in “Coase’s Penguin, or, 
Linux and The Nature of the Firm,”7 says that markets and firms 
are two different ways of solving the problem of information: 
how does one identify the best person for the job? Markets 
depend on price signals; firms depend on managerial discretion. 
Under a third option—one he calls “commons-based peer 
                                            
5 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
6 Ibid. at 405. 
7 112 Yale L.J. 369 (2002). The article is available online under a Creative 
Commons Attribution-Noncommercial Sharealike licence at 
http://www.yale.edu/yalelj/112/BenklerWEB.pdf.  
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production”8—the best individuals, working on a neutral 
network, self-identify and self-select for a given project. This 
option works best for projects with high levels of “granularity;” 
that is, projects which can be broken down into many small 
component parts, such as classifying craters on Mars (NASA 
Clickworkers), writing encyclopedias (Wikipedia), and even 
building online worlds (Second Life, a massive multi-player 
online game). Peer production has a big advantage over markets 
and firms: transaction costs are reduced essentially to zero 
(achieving ideal efficiency) so long as the group is large enough 
to aggregate resources and conduct peer review, and so long as 
each person has equal access to an informational network.  
Up until now, access to the informational network – the 
internet – has been near-neutral with respect to both the person 
using it and the data that the person is passing back and forth. 
The internet operates much like a public highway, in that it is 
indifferent to the person and his or her destination, as well as 
the type of data he or she is transmitting. However, the 
concentration of business and media that has occurred within 
the industrial information economy is being echoed in the basic 
infrastructure of the NIE – most people obtain high-speed 
internet access from either their cable or telephone provider. 
Moreover, new router technology allows internet providers to 
distinguish traffic between a subscriber and “undesirable” sites 
(e.g. a competitor’s or non-rent-paying site) and traffic between a 
subscriber and “good” sites (e.g. those of advertising partners) 
and vary the speed of access accordingly. Government 
regulations support this discrimination. Broadband internet 
access has been regarded in the United States since the Brand X 
case9 last year as an information “service” rather than a 
                                            
8 Ibid. at 375. 
9 National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 
545 U.S. 277 at 281 (2005). 
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telecommunications infrastructure, relieving cable and 
telephone carriers from the regulatory requirement to permit 
competition from other broadband service providers. Without 
significant pushback from citizens and businesses, the effect of 
these trends will be to needlessly destroy or, at least, inhibit the 
growth of a promising new arena for economic production. 
B. THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE 
The same characteristics that make peer production good at 
solving large-scale collective action problems in business may 
also make it better at resolving failures of participatory 
democracy in complex liberal societies than mass media. At 
root, Benkler argues, the public sphere, where political 
understandings are hammered out, is not linked to a particular 
forum but is rather a process of communication between 
citizens. He draws on Habermas’ definition of the public sphere 
as 
“…a network for communicating information and 
points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or 
negative attitudes);” which, in the process of 
communicating this information and these points of 
view, filters and synthesizes them “in such a way that 
they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public 
opinions.”10 
In liberal societies, this public sphere is (supposed to be) free of 
governmental coercion. The mass media have traditionally been 
understood to constitute those fora that take in various 
opinions, filter them, and synthesize them into “something 
more than private opinions held by some number of 
                                            
10 Supra, note 1 at 181. 
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individuals.”11 The media are good at this task because they are 
independent from government and professional researchers, and 
are almost universal in their reach. The high level of investment 
required to be in the media business (for printing presses, 
television studios, etc.), however, has made the media 
vulnerable to three criticisms that Benkler lists: first, their 
intake is extremely limited; second, concentration for business 
reasons has put the filtration of public opinion into the hands of 
a very few; and, third, dependence on advertising for cash flow 
pushes the media away from all but the most caricatured of 
provocative political discourse.12 
Peer production in the NIE can ameliorate these weaknesses. In 
the first place, intake is universal. No barriers (other than lack 
of a minimum level computer literacy) prevent an individual 
from, for example, setting up a blog. Second, recent research has 
shown that the structure of the internet tends to use social 
filtration and accreditation to resolve potential problems of 
information overload and fragmentation. Instead of the 
cacophony of everyone being heard equally, reader attention 
patterns and the process of “linking” harmonize individual 
thoughts into larger movements of opinion. The blog, which 
features short posts, intense dialogue, and extensive mutual 
linking, is an especially powerful tool for constructing opinions 
within a given community as well as building consensus or at 
least carrying on conversations across political lines. The rising 
influence of blogs has been noted in political campaigns 
(Howard Dean’s Democratic leadership bid) and mass media 
reporters now routinely canvass the more influential blogs when 
attempting to gauge the mood of the public. Finally, there are no 
costs incurred in communicating with a broad audience, so 
                                            
11 Ibid. at 184. 
12 Ibid. at 197. 
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individuals do not have to tone down their statements merely 
for the sake of preserving their cash flow. 
The internet is not likely to replace mass media, nor should it 
be seen necessarily as a threat to mass media’s existence. 
However, because the internet is more decentralized and less 
prone to capture by high-rolling owners and advertisers, it can 
give a stronger voice to marginal political groups and even serve 
as a watchdog over the watchdog, as was shown in the story of 
the Diebold voting machines. 
Benkler emphasizes that these virtual associations are forming 
spontaneously, and that their emergence is not due to laws or 
marketing, but rather is a function of the internet’s architecture 
and our basic human need to relate to one another. The public 
sphere precedes politics. Benkler does not argue that the state 
has no regulatory role, but only that it should take a “wait and 
see” approach to policy-making. It is too early to measure the 
potential of the NIE as a space for collective social action and, 
therefore, too early to impose laws that might privilege actors 
from the old industrial information economy. While 
governments could be investing in common, neutral network 
infrastructures that would allow new institutional spaces to 
form, Benkler mostly dismisses their “well-intentioned but 
wrongheaded efforts to optimize the institutional ecology for 
outdated modes of information and cultural production.”13 
Benkler says “… there is more freedom to be found through 
opening up institutional spaces for voluntary individual and 
cooperative action than there is in intentional public action 
through the state.”14 Unfortunately, governments on both sides 
of the Atlantic are using the ratcheting rhetoric of competitive 
advantage and “harmonization” to close off institutional spaces 
                                            
13 Ibid. at 21. 
14 Ibid. at 22.  
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in favour of economic interests. The European Union is even 
creating quasi-property rights in raw data under the Database 
Directive! 
III. PRESERVING AUTONOMY 
The benefits of the NIE to democracy are more basic than its 
power to enhance conversation within the public sphere. One of 
the foundational aspects of a liberal society is its regard for 
individual autonomy. The NIE and its peer production culture 
aims to enhance this autonomy by reconceptualizing the 
individual as a “user” rather than simply a “producer” or 
“consumer.” The user is a 
new category of relationship to information 
production and exchange. Users are individuals who 
are sometimes consumers and sometimes producers … 
the networked information economy promises to 
enrich individual autonomy substantively by creating 
an environment built less around control and more 
around facilitating action.15 [Emphasis mine.] 
The problem, says Benkler, is that we more often see the law’s 
effect on autonomy in formal terms rather than according to 
substantive outcomes. This is not entirely negative: trying to 
achieve outcomes through law can sometimes undermine the 
very autonomy we are trying to cultivate. However, given that 
law is a source of constraint, Benkler argues that we must look 
beyond laws that directly limit autonomy to “laws that 
structure the conditions of action for individuals living within 
the ambit of their effect.”16 In other words, our laws are already 
affecting outcomes – if we want our democracy and culture to 
                                            
15 Ibd. at 138. 
16 Ibid. at 142. 
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prosper, we should know what those outcomes are, and whether 
they are desirable.  
For example, Lawrence Lessig, in his book Free Culture,17 
criticizes the dramatic expansion in both the term and the scope 
of copyright that has occurred in the last fifty years. Not only 
have automatic copyright terms of 95 years – instituted in the 
1970s – prevented most of the cultural products of the twentieth 
century from entering the public domain, the notion of 
“property is good, more property is better”18 that Benkler 
attributes to judges and legislators has effectively turned the 
concept of “limited copyright” found in the U.S. Constitution 
into a regime of zero right to copy.  
Lessig’s description is supported by Benkler’s discussion of the 
case of Bridgeport Music, Inc.,19 where the court held that “any 
digital sampling, no matter how trivial [in this case, two 
seconds], could be the basis of a copyright suit.”20 Telling our 
artists, in the name of “intellectual property,” that they must be 
completely original in order to produce anything of artistic value 
restricts them (and thereby us) from criticizing, glamorizing, 
spoofing, and learning from our shared cultural history. 
Decisions such as Bridgeport Music have a chilling effect, not 
only on the creation of rap music, but also on the ability of 
anyone but the largest studios to immunize themselves against 
lawsuits (e.g. by obtaining insurance), even when an artist’s 
                                            
17 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity (New 
York: Penguin, 2004). A copy of the book is available online under a Creative 
Commons Attribution-Noncommercial Licence at http://free-
culture.cc/freecontent/.   
18 Supra, note 1 at 319. 
19 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) 
[Bridgeport Music]. 
20 Supra, note 1 at 444. 
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inclusion of copyrighted material falls under “fair use” 
guidelines.  
Intellectual property was created by law to encourage artists to 
devote themselves to their work, knowing that they would be 
able to reap the initial rewards. Lawmakers have lost sight of 
this autonomy-enhancing goal, and have interpreted intellectual 
property laws in ways that demean the individual, turning him 
or her into a passive consumer of mass-produced culture. 
Benkler points out two ways that information law can encroach 
on personal autonomy: first, it can increase the “relative 
capacity of some people systematically to constrain the 
perceptions or shape the preferences of others”21 and, second, it 
can “reduce significantly the range and variety of options open 
to people in society generally, or to certain classes of people.”22 
The failure that Benkler identifies—that is, the failure of 
supposedly liberal institutions to recognize the 
counterproductive outcomes of its laws—demonstrates one of 
the weaknesses of bare liberalism itself, which is its inability to 
see the cultural structures that stand between the individual and 
the state, and how the laws of the state reinforce certain cultural 
choices and groups to the exclusion of others. When bare 
liberalism encounters cultural change, even if that change is 
positive and flourishing, its political and legal institutions 
flounder. The weaknesses are exacerbated when powerful and 
well-funded interests, such as the Hollywood lobby or the 
recording industry (which, as Benkler points out, is not an 
artistic vehicle so much as a distribution channel – and an 
inefficient one when compared to peer-to-peer networks23), are 
                                            
21 Ibid. at 149. 
22 Ibid. at 150. 
23 Ibid. at 427. 
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able to gain influence and then use it to squelch competition or 
turn millions of people into so-called criminals for violating 
regressive copyright laws. 
IV. VULNERABILITIES OF THE NIE 
The strength of a given architecture is often its weakness as 
well. Democracy builds governmental legitimacy through the 
electoral system, but voter apathy can result in a cycle of 
worsening representation that ultimately undermines the 
legitimacy elections were created to instil. The industrial 
information economy excels at reaching large audiences; 
however, it may be captured by a well-capitalized media 
oligarchy. Benkler, in writing what is at heart a manifesto for 
the internet (though philosophically deeper than the cheeky 
Cluetrain Manifesto24 and less obviously idealistic than the IFLA 
Manifesto25), doesn’t pay much attention to the way in which 
the NIE is vulnerable to technical capture in the same way the 
industrial information economy is vulnerable to capital capture. 
In the NIE, the potential capture point is at the filtration stage. 
There are only a few search engines that filter most of the 
information on the internet – Google being the best known 
among them – and the top tools are provided by corporations 
using proprietary algorithms. Google’s willingness to collaborate 
with the Chinese government in filtering out “destabilizing” 
                                            
24 The Cluetrain Manifesto can be found online at 
http://cluetrain.com/#manifesto. The manifesto was largely aimed at 
corporations trying to leverage the vast internet audience, and its central 
message is “We are not seats or eyeballs or end users or consumers. We are 
human beings – and our reach exceeds your grasp. Deal with it.” 
25 The IFLA Manifesto (http://www.ifla.org/III/misc/im-e.htm) is a paean to 
the right to freedom of expression and opinion found in Article 19 of the U.N. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that “[internet] access should 
neither be subject to any form of ideological, political or religious censorship, 
nor to economic barriers.”  
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information for the sake of market advantage is troubling to say 
the least. As Benkler himself states, 
A fundamental requirement of self-direction is the 
capacity to perceive the state of the world, to conceive 
of available options for action, to connect actions to 
consequences, to evaluate alternative outcomes, and 
to decide upon and pursue an action accordingly.26 
Yet if potential perceptions are filtered out before they ever get 
to the screen, if prospective “users” never discovers what 
actions are available to them, how much use is universal intake 
of opinion, or even the most efficient accreditation and review 
structures?  
Benkler provides strong ammunition against the assault on the 
NIE by the old industrial information economy, vigorously 
defending the internet’s right to exist as it is in the face of the 
self-preservation tactics employed by industries fearing 
significant losses as a result of the growing popularity of file-
sharing. Benkler’s support for “municipal funding of open access 
broadband networks, state funding of basic research, and 
possible strategic regulatory interventions to negate monopoly 
control over essential resources in the digital environment”27 
better addresses economic and social conditions than the hands-
off legal framework that Lessig advocates. In Benkler’s view, the 
trouble is that the policy driving present regulatory 
interventions is wrongly framed in 
 … local specific terms. We ask questions like, Will 
this policy optimize ‘spectrum management’ in these 
frequencies, or, Will this decrease the number of CDs 
                                            
26 Supra, note 1 at 146. 
27 Ibid. at 21. 
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sold? However, the basic, overarching question that 
we must learn to ask in all these debates is: Are we 
leaving enough institutional space for the social-
economic practices of networked information 
production to emerge?28 
Benkler’s book is a comprehensive but readable survey of the 
policy choices we must make if we are to allow the NIE to 
flourish (and he clearly signals which parts of the book are of 
particular interest to the technical illuminati). Wealth of 
Networks is a worthwhile outward- and forward-looking 
manifesto for an information infrastructure that has come of 
age. At the same time, internet advocates would do well to take 
Benkler’s lessons in the history of the industrial information 
economy to heart, and to work hard to fulfil his vision of a true 
commons-based and non-proprietary ecology within the 
networked information economy. 
                                            
28 Ibid. at 393. 
